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Abstract: 
Purpose: A closed keiretsu subcontracting network is a key feature of Japan’s manufacturing industry. 
While subcontracting systems have been observed in various fields, including the content industry, 
the literature largely focuses on the assembly industry, where the contribution of these systems to 
high productivity has been appreciated. Except industrial and government reports addressing unfair 
trade and inefficiency problems, there is a dearth of systematic analyses on subcontracting systems 
in Japan’s content industry. Thus, this study aims to theoretically examine why subcontracting 
systems work efficiently in some sectors but not in others, particularly Japan’s content industry. 
Methodology: This study applies multitask agency and common agency theories to models that 
attribute issues in the content industry to inefficiencies in the overall subcontracting system and the 
asymmetric distribution of benefits. It is proved that certain characteristics of the content industries 
appear to worsen agency problems under the subcontracting system. 
Findings/Contribution: The important characteristics are that products have ambiguous quality 
attributes which are difficult to verify in contracts, and that subcontractors in Japan traditionally 
work with multiple contractors. The findings highlight the importance of recognizing the essential 
features of the abovementioned problems to vitalize Japan’s content industry. Thus, this study 
contributes to the literature that has yet to thoroughly address these factors.  
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1. Introduction: Conditions for Subcontracting Systems to Work 
A closed vertical cooperation system, or the so-called keiretsu subcontracting network, is a key 
feature of the Japanese manufacturing industry. Studies have largely attributed subcontracting 
systems to the success of assembly industries in Japan, ignoring their role in various other fields, 
including the content industry. With the exception of industrial and government reports on unfair 
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trade and inefficiency problems1, there is a lack of systematic analyses on subcontracting systems, 
particularly in the context of Japan’s content industry. This study aims to theoretically explore why 
subcontracting systems work efficiently in some sectors but not in others. The functions of 
subcontracting systems starkly differ between the assembly and content industries, alluding to the 
conditions under which subcontracting systems operate. Hereinafter, this section discusses various 
industrial and governmental reports on Japan’s content industry and highlights how the 
circumstances detailed in the reports differ from those in the literature on assembly industries.  
Most studies on Japan’s subcontracting systems in the last decades of the 20th century focus on 
the assembly industry. These works often attribute high productivity and competitiveness in the 
assembly industries to subcontracting systems. Empirical research highlights a positive correlation 
between the technical efficiency of various industries and the intensity of their subcontracting 
systems2 . Scholars have theoretically analysed the contribution of subcontracting systems using 
concepts to describe their attributes, including relation-specific skills (Asanuma, 1989, 1998), voice 
strategy (Helper, 1991), face-to-face competition (Itoh & Matsui, 1989), and delegation of work 
(Fujimoto, 1998). These concepts and hypotheses are based on observations from the automobile and 
electric appliance industries, and thus, may not be appropriate to comprehensively analyse 
subcontracting systems in other industries. While these theories can help explain the workings of the 
subcontracting systems, they do not identify the conditions necessary for them to exist and function. 
The slump and declining competitiveness in Japan’s assembly industry following the 1990s turned 
researchers’ focus toward production management theories, during which more developed 
production systems such as extended enterprises emerged 3 . As a result, studies on the Japanese 
subcontracting system remain confined to the assembly industry.  
In this analysis, subcontracting is a long-term, close, and robust relationship between a producer 
and its suppliers, as in keiretsu.4 In most cases, a subcontracting system is a multi-tiered hierarchy, 
observed in not only the assembly industry but also various industrial sectors in Japan. The Small 
and Medium Enterprise Agency under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) 
formulated guidelines applicable to 18 fields to prevent prime contractors from abusing their superior 
bargaining position under the Subcontracting Act5. Among the 18 fields, these guidelines have been 
mandated in Japan’s broadcasting content production and animation production6. The guidelines for 
the two industries are based on case studies conducted by competent research committees and are 
constantly updated. The case studies are on the infringements of the Subcontracting Act, such as 
abuse by those in dominant positions during transactions. The cases also include examples such as 
 
1 Freeman (2000) and Uesugi (2008) discuss the role of keiretsu in the media industry. However, their studies 
focus on the hierarchical ownerships of newspaper companies, and thus, ignore keiretsu subcontracting systems.  
2 Torii (1992, 2001) estimated and analysed technical efficiencies in industries in 1977 and in 1995 respectively. 
In addition, Japan’s SME Agency reports that in 1995, the average technical efficiency of industries that depend 
on subcontractors for more than 30 percent of their supplies was 79.2 percent, while the equivalent efficiency of 
industries that depend on subcontractors for less than 30 percent of their supplies was 65.1 percent. See 1998 
White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises, The Small and Medium Enterprise Agency. Available online: 
http://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/pamflet/hakusyo/H10/index.html. (accessed 25/09/2019) 
3  Extended enterprises apply information technology to supply chain management and customer relation 
management (Dyer, 2000). 
4 The literature uses the term subcontracting to denote the purchase of parts or processing services. Similar to 
Asanuma and Kikutani (1992), most studies analysing Japan’s assembly industry apply the term to the purchase 
of customized or ‘Drawing Supplied’ parts. This study adopts the traditional definition of Japan’s content 
producers. 
5 http://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/keiei/torihiki/guideline.htm, (accessed 25/09/2019) 
6 http://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/keiei/torihiki/2014/140313shitaukeGL10.pdf (accessed 25/09/2019) and 
http://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/keiei/torihiki/2014/140313shitaukeGL9.pdf (accessed 25/09/2019) 
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unfair demand for price cuts and refusal to receive work from a subcontractor without reasons 
attributable to the subcontractor. 
According to METI, TV stations and film distribution companies are highly concentrated, and 
thus, content producers must depend on them for financing and marketing, which leads to the unfair 
distribution of value-added benefits7. Japan’s Fair Trade Committee (JFTC) reports that among 281 
companies, 35 broadcast programme producers work with third-tier or below subcontractors, 120 
companies engage with second-tier subcontractors, and 102 associate with primary subcontractors. 
Further, 39.4 percent admit to experiencing abuse by those in dominant positions at broadcasting 
stations. Of the typical cases of abuse, 20.2 percent producers report experiencing unfair demands for 
price cuts 8  and 19.7 percent have been forced to transfer the copyrights of an on-air-ready 
programme they produced with little or no compensation. Iwade and Yamaguchi (2017) suggest that 
while the total box-office revenue of the animation industry is expanding, the share of content 
producers’ sales remains at a low 11 percent9. 
The content industry is well known for its low wages. In 2005, the Japan Institute for Labor Policy 
and Training reported the severe working conditions and the high rate of personnel turnover in the 
animation production industry10. According to the Japanese Animation Creators Association, the 
mean annual revenue of animation creators was 3,328 thousand yen in 2015, which is 24 percent 
lower than the average salary in the private sector reported in the Statistical Survey of Actual Status 
of Salary in the Private Sector11. Iwade and Yamaguchi (2017) define Japan’s animation industry as 
exhausted and struggling to catch up with the new 3DCG technology. While low wages in artistic 
industries is not a structural problem specific to Japan (Yuugami, 2006), Japanese workers continue 
to earn wages lower than those of workers doing similar work in other countries (Ohashi, 2006). 
This seemingly unfair distribution in the content industry is in strong contrast to the cooperative 
relationships in the assembly industry, where assemblers and suppliers engage in risk-sharing 
activities to mitigate the effects of economic fluctuations. Risk-sharing activities are a key function of 
subcontracting systems (Kawasaki & McMillan, 1987; Asanuma & Kikutani, 1992). These activities 
serve as a base to nourish trust and vertical collaboration between assemblers and suppliers and 
enable the proliferation of new technologies (Suzuki, 1993). 
The contribution of supplier systems in Japan is not based on factors specific to the assembly 
industry. For example, TV stations subcontract the production of ready-to-air programmes and this 
entails the delegation of the entire task. The skills required for subcontractors are contingent on the 
manner in which a station employs current technologies, which is relation specific; alternatively, 
subcontractors can implement voice strategies (Helper, 1991). Close vertical relationships work well 
in some industries but not in some others, making it imperative to explore the conditions necessary 
 
7 See the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry’s N Report: Toward a New Industrial Structure (p.82), Research 
Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, June 2004. Available online: https://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai-
shimon/minutes/2005/0613/item4.pdf (accessed 25/09/2019) 
8 See the Japan Fair Trade Committee’s Survey Report on Transactions of TV Program Production Japan Fair 
Trade Committee, 2015. Available online: http://www.jftc.go.jp/houdou/pressrelease/h27/jul/150729.html 
(accessed 25/09/2019) 
9 In 2015, while the total box-office revenue was 1,826 billion yen, the total sale of content producers was 201 
billion yen. 
10  The Japan Institute for Labor Policy and Training, Employment and Human Resource Development in 
Contents Industries – Report of Research in Animation Industry –, March 2005 Available online: 
http://www.jil.go.jp/institute/reports/2005/documents/025.pdf (accessed 25/09/2019) 
11 Japan Animation Creators Association, Survey of Animation Creators 2015, (in Japanese). Available online: 
http://www.janica.jp/survey/survey2015Report.pdf. (accessed 25/09/2019). Ohashi (2006) also details the poor 
working conditions in Japan’s animation production. 
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for such subcontracting systems to work. Inferior outcomes from vertical relationships imply the 
failure to deal with transaction costs. The theories previously enumerated in this section demonstrate 
the possibilities of dealing with such transaction costs, although they are inductions from cases in the 
assembly industry. This raises the question of whether the content industry incurs unmanageable 
transaction costs. The literature suggests that the factors affecting transaction costs include complex 
and uncertain transactions, unverifiability, specificity of assets, and asymmetric information. 
However, does this imply that content products are more complex than parts supplied to the 
assembly industry12? 
This study employs the multitask agency and common agency theories to address these 
questions, particularly why a closed vertical cooperation system works in some industries and not in 
others, and to determine ways to enhance the performance of the content industry. Multitask agency 
and common agency problems are two major issues examined in a principal-agent model13. In fact, 
certain characteristics of the content industries appear to worsen these problems under the 
subcontracting system. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the 
multitask agency problem and Section 3 details the common agency problem. Section 4 concludes the 
study. 
2. Multitask Agency Problems in the Content Industry 
 Agency problems fall into two categories, adverse selection and moral hazard. An agent is 
delegated a task or tasks by a principal and then, allocates resources to an activity or activities. The 
process results in outcomes that benefit the principal. Adverse selection arises when the principal has 
to contract an agent without adequate information about the agent’s attributes (e.g. abilities). The 
efficient performance of the activities depends on the agent’s attributes. The agreed-upon contract, 
however, is not implemented to reflect the precise attributes required of the agent, giving the agent 
the opportunity to earn rent from this private information. Thus, the activity inspired by the 
incentives in the contract does not coincide with the optimal possibility, which results in inefficiency 
in the transaction outcome. On the other hand, a moral hazard arises when the principal cannot 
observe the activity. Here, activities are assumed as the effort level chosen by the agent. While the 
benefit for the principal depends on the activity, its level cannot be directly controlled. The contract 
specifies a reward for the agent that is linked with the final outcome because the result is observable. 
However, because the result reflects the activity imperfectly given the presence of noise, or the agent 
chooses risk-avoiding options, the activity chosen departs from the optimal possibility, resulting in 
inefficiency. 
The multitask agency problem is a type of moral hazard that arises when an agent is 
simultaneously assigned multiple tasks by the principal14. The agent must allocate his/her resources 
among these multiple activities to achieve these tasks. In general, the outcomes of the chosen activities 
are multidimensional and result in stochastic noise, such that they do not directly reflect the allocated 
resources. While the outcomes are supposed to be correlated with the allocated resources, the results 
of multiple activities often depend on each other. This makes it increasingly difficult to tackle the 
multitask agency problem. Another factor contributing to the complexity of this situation is that the 
principal may be able to easily observe outcomes in some situations but may find it difficult to do so 
in some others (e.g. product quality). If an important factor determining the performance of the 
 
12 In addition to these factors, Minetaki and Motohashi (2007, 2008) highlight that competitive pressure among 
prime contractors affect transaction costs in the content industry. Terrestrial TV stations, for example, are 
protected by entry regulations in Japan. 
13 The first literature that investigated content industries with concepts of agency problems and transaction cost 
is Caves (2000). 
14 See Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (2000). 
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principal’s payoff is not reflected in the agent’s reward, this leads to biased resource allocation and 
thus, inefficient system performance. The model analysis highlights that contracts should not be 
designed to reward only easily observable outcomes because this compels the agent to engage in 
biased resource allocation towards activities expected to result in the desired outcome more directly15. 
Consider a content industry in which the content distributor delegates production to the 
subcontractor. To strengthen the present analysis, I focus on TV programmes as a content example. 
The principal is the programmes distributor (i.e. TV stations) and the agent is the programmes 
producer. As the principal, the TV station requires the producer under a subcontracting scheme to 
supply a high audience-rating programme that attracts a large number of viewers. In addition, the 
TV station may require the agent to produce a high-quality programme because it perceives this to 
be an overall concern for viewers or at least a concern for the relevant authority. 
The viewers, as end consumers, evaluate the content through their watching activities, that is, 
the amount of consumption. In addition to the number of viewers, programmes are evaluated for 
their quality, although programme quality is difficult to define. Some studies employ the term 
‘programme quality’ to indicate the extent to which viewers consider a programme attractive—this 
approach is no different from evaluating programmes on the basis of the number of viewers (Motta 
& Polo, 1997; Nilssen & Sørgard, 2000). By contrast, some others use the term to evaluate programmes 
as merit goods (Musgrave, 1959). Cabizza and Fraja (1998) argue that TV authorities, and not viewers, 
evaluate quality. Viewers, nevertheless, express concerns about the broadcast of low-quality 
programmes, particularly those targeted at children16. This study uses ‘quality’ to refer to content 
attributes prioritized by viewers but not fully reflected in the actual numbers of viewers. In addition, 
it assumes programmes that are produced and broadcasted can be assigned two attributes: 
attractiveness, which is directly reflected in the number of viewers, and quality, which is appreciated 
by viewers but less intensely reflected in the number of viewers. In other words, producers gain a 
smaller audience when investing a given amount of effort into quality as opposed to attractiveness. 
Supplying a high-quality programme, thus, becomes another task to be achieved by the agent 
delegated by the TV station. However, while the number of viewers can be easily estimated, this is 
not the case for quality. Given the definition of quality adopted in this study, quality level is only 
partially reflected in the TV station’s profits. Nevertheless, the station may gain in reputation among 
the public and this reputation boost could contribute to profits in the long run. Since the supplier’s 
efforts to produce high-quality programmes are only partly evaluated, programme quality is 
allocated fewer resources. If the total surplus of the TV broadcasting system is assumed to be the sum 
of the total utility of viewers, which includes quality evaluations, and the profits of the TV station 
and producer, the system as a whole suffers from inefficiency owing to biased resource allocation. 
The same resource allocation bias exists even if programme production is not delegated to 
suppliers but executed by the TV station itself to maximize profits. The subcontracting system, 
however, plays two critical roles. First, when programme production is delegated by TV stations, 
quality evaluations may differ between the TV stations and producers. Consider a case in which 
viewers’ request for high-quality programmes is recognized more by TV stations than by producers. 
TV stations are in closer contact with viewers than are producers and thus, they regularly encounter 
viewer requests or claims and may better understand the importance of quality. Consequently, the 
 
15 Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) proved the reason why cost efficiency should not be rewarded as ‘Missing 
Incentive Clause in Contracts.’ Cost efficiency is relatively easy to observe while the high quality is difficult, 
then incentive provision on cost efficiency devastates the quality. The optimal contract is a fixed reward. 
16 See Walsh, Laczniak and Carlson. (1998). In addition, see Graham and Davies (1997) and the Department For 
Culture, Media And Sport (1999), Market Failure in Broadcasting, Annex 8,  
Future Funding of the BBC. Independent Review Panel, available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/bbc_funding_review/annex8.pdf (accessed 25/09/2019) 
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delegation of production results in less efficient resource allocation than does in-house production, 
unless the quality is clearly specified in the contract. On the other hand, producers may better 
understand the importance of quality because it is intrinsic to the production process. In such cases, 
viewers’ requests for high-quality programmes align with the producers’ ethics. However, 
producers’ efforts to supply high-quality programmes receive low evaluations by TV stations. Thus, 
content producers face a trade-off between relinquished profits and self-respect, and eventually, 
incur expenses that are not compensated by the TV station. 
Second, the subcontracting system may suffer from the opportunity to ‘hold up’, which occurs 
when one party is heavily invested in the relationship and thereby locked in. Programmes produced 
by subcontractors generally exhibit the attributes of quality. However, the quality of a programme is 
unverifiable. Traded products with unverifiable attributes generally incur higher transaction costs 
because this situation gives the principal the opportunity to hold up the contractor. TV stations may 
claim the programme to be too low in quality to pay the contracted price or too high in quality to 
compensate for the production cost. Low quality is the most frequent pretext used by principal parties 
to justify unfair price cuts in the case of animation production producers17. Costs that are not specified 
in the initial contract are difficult to compensate, even when the customer orders changes in the 
specifications18. 
In the assembly industry, the quality of parts supplied is undoubtedly important. Given the 
simultaneous demand for cost efficiency, the assembly industry is likely to face a similar multitask 
agency problem. However, the quality of assembled parts is observable if greater investments are 
made in inspections since quality can be captured through physical specifications and thus, described 
in the contract if necessary. Moreover, there is little discrepancy in evaluations between consumers 
and assembling companies because consumer evaluation is reflected in profits earned from product 
sales. Lower-quality parts degrade the quality of the end product, affecting profits and thus, 
assemblers are concerned with the quality of parts supplied by their subcontractors. Assembling 
companies can design optimal incentive schemes with quality standards to maximize profits, 
although they must consider noise and correlations among multifactor performance observations. 
While the system’s efficiency is controllable, it is somewhat impaired depending on the magnitude 
of the noise and its correlations. Thus, the multitask problem is less severe in the assembly industry 
than in the content industry. 
The content industry does not always suffer failures caused by multitask agency problems. 
NHK-BS, a satellite TV broadcasting channel operated by Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), 
has avoided this problem and succeeded in providing high-quality programmes. NHK is the public 
broadcasting service (PBS) in Japan and NHK-BS is a platform that uses broadcasting satellites (BS) 
to air programmes. The service was launched in 1989 and acquired satisfactory and increasing 
viewership throughout the 1990s19. The subscription fee for NHK is termed a receiving fee (paid 
equally by all households and businesses with a TV set) in the NHK budget that must be approved 
 
17 Among the reasons cited by producers for not being paid as initially contracted, ‘lower quality than the 
standard’ accounts for 83.3 percent. See Report of Contents Industry Support Project, 2015, p.108 (Survey 
Project on Structural Change and Overseas Deployment Strategy Analysis in Content Industry), Mitsubishi UFJ 
Research and Consulting Co. Available online: http://www.meti.go.jp/meti_lib/report/2016fy/000709.pdf 
(accessed 25/09/2019) 
18 There are numerous cases reported in the Survey Report on Transactions of TV Program Production, Japan Fair 
Trade Committee, 2015. Available online: http://www.jftc.go.jp/houdou/pressrelease/h27/jul/150729.html 
(accessed 25/09/2019) 
19 The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications describes steady increases throughout the 1990s. See 
Research Report of Optimal Number of Channels held by NHK Satellite Broadcasting, Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, 2008. Available online: https://search.e-
gov.go.jp/servlet/PcmFileDownload?seqNo=0000037673 (accessed 25/09/2019) 
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by the Diet. NHK was faced with the requirement of increasing its revenue without raising the fee 
and met this requirement by introducing the NHK-BS service20. Satellite broadcasting was limited to 
NHK-BS and a private station prior to expanding the number of its channels by introducing digitized 
broadcasts through BS in 2000, when private companies began broadcasting their channels. However, 
private BS channels faced several difficulties in acquiring viewers. Consequently, they began 
reporting deficits and took a decade to generate positive cash flow. 
Prior to launching BS channels, NHK produced all its programmes in-house. Thereafter, they 
began outsourcing their production because of limited resources. At the time, free-to-air private 
terrestrial TV stations that depended on advertisement revenue tended to air fewer documentary 
programmes owing to the excessive costs. This prompted NHK to emphasize documentary 
programmes, subcontracting their production to producers with significant experience in delivering 
such content to private channels. Consequently, NHK-BS was offering new attractive channels full of 
high-quality programmes21. 
NHK-BS, thus, managed to avoid the multitask agency problem by introducing broadcasting 
channels they expected would serve as a revenue source in the long run. Simply put, the pressure to 
provide high-quality programmes pushed the national broadcaster to provide high-quality 
programmes, which is reflected in the ultimate payoff to the principal. In such a situation, the parties 
succeed in collaborating with one another and the principal has no reason to hold up the producers22. 
3. Common Agency Problems in the Content Industry 
3.1. Common Agency 
Common agency refers to a case in which multiple principals trade with one agent. A typical 
example is when more than one manufacturer enjoys a monopoly in each product trade with the 
same product distributor. The manufacturers delegate the decisions related to sales amounts or retail 
prices to the distributor. This process warrants coordination and results in collusive outcomes 
(Bernheim & Whinston, 1985).  
This section considers a case in which an adverse selection problem is caused by asymmetric 
information between the principals and the agent. The adverse selection problem requires a contract 
design in which the incentive mechanism induces the agent to select expected activities. However, 
the principal incurs an incentive mechanism cost in the form of additional rent for the agent. 
Therefore, the principal designs the contract such that the gap between the optimal and induced 
activities remains, although this results in inefficiencies.  
If the principals do not employ a common agent, they delegate the tasks to separate agents. Each 
relationship is the same as the simple principal–agent relationship, although the agents compete with 
each other in differentiated markets. This competitive relationship between the two principal–agent 
pairs is described as exclusive agency. Martimort (1996) evaluates the outcome of common agency in 
comparison with that of exclusive agency. The author concludes that if the principal’s products are 
substitutes for each other, then the competition between the agents under exclusive agency reduces 
 
20 For details on the cost and revenue structure of NHK, see the report by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communication cited in the previous footnote. 
21 The Association of All Japan TV Program Production Companies (ATP), The Future of NHK-BS, mimeo, 
presented at Research Committee of Optimal Number of Channels held by NHK Satellite Broadcasting. 
Available online: 
http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/joho_tsusin/policyreports/chousa/nhk_ch/pdf/080229_2_si1.pdf 
(accessed 25/09/2019) 
22 See the previous footnote. 
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the amount of information rent they acquire, indicating inefficient common agency. However, if the 
variance in the agents’ attributes is not as large, then the reduced information asymmetry may make 
common agency the dominant strategy. On the other hand, if the principals’ products are 
complementary to each other, the importance of coordination makes common agency more efficient 
than exclusive agency. 
3.2. Multiple Contractor Strategy 
If the close vertical relationship in Japan’s industries is considered a principal-agent relationship, 
then common agents represent subcontractors who trade with multiple contractors, while exclusive 
agents in Martimort (1996) are subcontractors who belong to a closed keiretsu relationship. Keiretsu is 
a hierarchical system similar to a pyramid, and thus, subcontractors can trade with only one 
contractor (Fujita, 1965). Keiretsu subcontracting systems were particularly common in the 20th-
century assembly industry23. In the current content industry, producers do not belong to keiretsu and 
are considered to operate under common agency24. JFTC reports that a majority of the producers have 
contracts with several contractors25. Intuitively, subcontractors with multiple contractors have greater 
bargaining power than those who depend on a single contractor. In general, if an agent has many 
external options for trade, the agent can enjoy a stronger position in the transaction. 
This raises the question of why subcontractors in Japan’s content industry suffer disadvantages 
in surplus distribution. A possible hypothesis is the common agency problem. Subcontractors have 
multiple principals and are simultaneously engaged in close vertical relationships with each 
principal, a situation not specific to the content industry. In Japan, subcontractors are encouraged to 
engage with multiple contractors or diversify their trading partners to modernize their production 
systems or to discard obsolete keiretsu subcontracting systems26. The 2006 White Paper on Small and 
Medium Enterprises reports that the number of trade partners has increased over the past decade27. In 
the decade leading up to 2006, more than half the companies in every industry have relied on their 
top three customers—sales to these customers account for 61 percent of the companies’ total revenue. 
In 2006, however, the rate of companies depending on their top three customers was less than half, 
 
23 In the 1970s, the rate of firms in Japan that heavily depended on one contractor was 54 percent among 
subcontractors (see 1979 White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises, Part 1, Chapter 2, Section 6. Available 
online: https://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/pamflet/hakusyo/S54/index.html (accessed 25/09/2019). Firms that rely 
on one contractor generally (i) depend on one contractor (ii) rely on two contractors but one contractor accounts 
for more than 75 percent of the work, or (iii) depend on three contractors but one contractor accounts for more 
than 50 percent of the work. 
24 In a survey conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 95 producing firms state 
they have no keiretsu relationship and 81 firms mention having a parent company. See Survey Report on 
Producers of Programs Broadcast, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2006. Available online: 
http://www.soumu.go.jp/johotsusintokei/statistics/pdf/HK200600_001.pdf (accessed 25/09/2019) 
25 Among the participating producers, 87.6 percent rely on subcontracting work whose share is more than 50 
percent in sales. Of the 340 producers, 13.8 percent contract with one contractor and 29.4 percent have contracts 
with 1–5 contractors, which is a typical case. See Survey Reports of the Subcontracting in TV Program Producing 
Industry and the Amendment of the Subcontracting Law, Japan Fair Trade Committee, 2004. Available online: 
http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/998203/www.jftc.go.jp/pressrelease/04.february/040213-02-hontai.pdf 
(accessed 25/09/2019) 
26 See 2015 White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises, Part 2, Chapter 1, Section 1, available online: 
http://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/pamflet/hakusyo/H27/download/2015hakusho_eng.pdf (accessed 25/09/2019), 
and 2006 White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises, Part 2, Chapter 3, available online: 
http://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/pamflet/hakusyo/h18/download/2006hakusho_eng.pdf. (accessed 25/09/2019) 
27 2006 White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises, p.114. available online: 
http://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/pamflet/hakusyo/h18/download/2006hakusho_eng.pdf. (accessed 25/09/2019) 
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except in the automobile industry. Another noteworthy mention in the White Paper is that enterprises 
that ‘increase open transactions through standardization of products and parts’ and with ‘weakened 
affiliations or cooperation with specific enterprises’ perform worse than other enterprises in terms of 
both sales and profit ratios. 
3.3. Model Analysis 
This section constructs a model to test the hypothesis that issues faced by subcontractors in the 
content industry are attributable to the common agency problem. Martimort (1996) proposes a similar 
model, although it is not directly applicable to the case considered in this study. Martimort’s model 
is based on manufacturers delegating their product sales to agents and the basic structure can be 
applied to analyse the delegation of parts supplies to subcontractors. A key feature of Martimort’s 
model is the substitutive or complementary nature of demands; however, this study focuses on the 
delegation of production and not sales. Thus, I reconstruct the model to adjust to a situation in which 
the principal delegates production to the agent. The model analyses the substitutive and 
complementary relationships in the cost structure. Substitutability in cost is another way of 
describing the convexity of the cost function in a multiproduct firm, while complementarity is 
represented by concavity. Since the validity of Martimort’s (1996) result in this construction is 
uncertain, I conduct a simple model analysis. 
First, consider a case in which one principal trades with one agent. Hereinafter, the principal is 
denoted by P and the agent is A. P is a TV station and A is a programme producer. P needs 𝑞 
programmes to broadcast. The number of programmes required, 𝑞, is assumed to be constant. A 
enters into a subcontracting contract with P for programmes production. The production cost per 
programme is a constant 𝑐 − 𝑖 if A invests 𝑖 prior to the production, where 𝑐 is assumed to be 
constant, and investment 𝑖  costs A the amount 𝜃𝑖2/2 . 𝜃 is a parameter and is A’s private 
information. This parameter is known to A prior to entering into the contract, although this is not the 
case for P. P only knows 𝜃 has a probabilistic distribution with a uniform distribution on [𝜃0, 𝜃1]. 
On the other hand, P can observe variable 𝑖 from the communication with A beforehand or through 
some value analysis. P offers payment (𝑖) , which is a function of investment 𝑖 by A. The timing of 
the game is as follows: (1) A knows the own-investment parameter 𝜃. (2) P offers A contract 𝑤(𝑖). 
(3) A accepts or refuses the offer; if A refuses, the payoff for A is 0 and the game ends. (4) If A accepts 
the offer, A invests 𝑖. (5) Trades are executed and a payment is made. In this model, 𝑞 is assumed to 
be constant and describe the subcontracting relationships. This assumption differs from those in 
typical adverse-selection models, wherein A has an incentive to induce an expected effort. Note that 
the investment cost does not depend on 𝑞 as a fixed cost in this model. 
A’s payoff from accepting the offer, denoted as 𝜋𝐴 , is 
𝜋𝐴(𝑖, 𝜃) = 𝑤(𝑖) − (𝑐 − 𝑖)𝑞 −
𝜃𝑖2
2
.  
The first best outcome which minimizes total cost (𝑐 − 𝑖)𝑞 + 𝜃𝑖2/2 is attained by the investment of 
𝑖 = 𝑖𝐹 ≡ 𝑞/𝜃 . 
The problem to be solved by P is 
min
𝑤(⋅)
𝐸 (𝑤(𝑖∗(𝜃)))  s. t.  𝑖∗(𝜃) = argmax
𝑖
𝜋𝐴(𝑖, 𝜃) ,  𝜋𝐴(𝑖
∗(𝜃), 𝜃) ≥ 0.  
A standard procedure applied to the problem with a revelation principle gives us the following 
solution: 
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 𝑖∗(𝜃) =
𝑞
2𝜃 − 𝜃0
,  
 𝑤(𝑖) = (𝑐 −
𝑖
2
) 𝑞 +
1
4
(𝜃0𝑖
2 −
𝑞2
2𝜃1 − 𝜃0
).  
Under the optimal contract, efficient investment 𝑖𝐹is attained when A’s attributes are the lowest (𝜃 =
𝜃0); otherwise, the reward for A induces insufficient investment compared to the optimal contract 
(𝑖∗ = 𝑞/(2𝜃 − 𝜃0) < 𝑞/𝜃 = 𝑖
𝐹). 
Next, consider a case with two Ps, 𝑃1  and 𝑃2 . Each P requires a fixed number of 𝑞𝑖 
programmes (𝑖 = 1,2). This model does not assume competition between programmes and thus, 
coordination does not generate profits. In contrast to Martimort’s (1996) model, which assumes a 
substitutive or complementary relationship in demand, the present model assumes complementarity 
in the cost structure. The effects of investment in production appear for both Ps because the 
technologies required are the same. Thus, if A invests 𝑖, the unit production costs for both Ps are 𝑐 −
𝑖. 
𝑃1 and 𝑃2 independently offer A 𝑤1(𝑖) and 𝑤2(𝑖). A decides whether to accept one of them, to 
accept both, or to refuse both28. When A refuses both offers, the game ends with zero payoff for all. 
When A selects only one offer, the outcome is the same as the previous case of the one-to-one contract. 
When A accepts both offers, A chooses 𝑖. The assumptions are the same: 𝑐 is a constant, investment 
𝑖 requires cost 𝜃𝑖2/2, and 𝜃 has a uniform distribution on [𝜃0, 𝜃1]. The timing of the game is also 
the same: offers are made simultaneously, as are the decisions to accept or refuse, and Ps are unaware 
of the other party’s offer. 
The payoffs of A when A accepts both offers and when A accepts the offer by 𝑃𝑗, denoted as 
𝜋𝐴
12,  𝜋𝐴
𝑗
 (𝑗 = 1,2), are as follows: 
 𝜋𝐴
12(𝑖, 𝜃) = 𝑤1(𝑖) + 𝑤2(𝑖) − (𝑐 − 𝑖)(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) −
𝜃𝑖2
2
, 
 𝜋𝐴
𝑗(𝑖, 𝜃) = 𝑤𝑗(𝑖) − (𝑐 − 𝑖)𝑞𝑗 −
𝜃𝑖2
2
. 
 
The problems to be solved by 𝑃𝑗  (𝑗 = 1,2) are 
min
𝑤𝑗(⋅)
𝐸 (𝑤𝑗(𝑖
∗(𝜃))) ,    s. t.  𝑖∗(𝜃) = argmax𝑖 𝜋𝐴
12(𝑖, 𝜃), 
𝜋𝐴
12(𝑖∗(𝜃), 𝜃) ≥ 𝜋𝐴
𝑗′(𝑖, 𝜃),  𝜋𝐴
12(𝑖∗(𝜃), 𝜃) ≥ 0, (𝑗, 𝑗′ = 1,2,  𝑗 ≠ 𝑗′). 
 
The optimal solution to this problem is 
𝑖∗(𝜃) =
𝑞1 + 𝑞2
3𝜃 − 2𝜃0
, 𝑤𝑗(𝑖) =
𝑖(𝜃0𝑖 − 2(𝑞1 + 𝑞2))
6
+ 𝛼𝑗 , (𝑗 = 1,2) 
 
Where 
 
28 Common agency here is ‘delegated’ in categories defined by Martimort and Stole (2006). A can select a contract 
with only one P. However, in this model, the solution is restricted to a situation in which A contracts with both 
Ps. 
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𝛼𝑗 ∈ [𝑐𝑞𝑗 −
9(2𝑞𝑗 − 𝑞𝑗′)𝑞𝑗′𝜃1 − (𝑞𝑗
2 − 10𝑞𝑗𝑞𝑗′ + 7𝑞𝑗′
2 ) 𝜃0
6(3𝜃1 − 2𝜃0)(3𝜃1 − 𝜃0)
, 𝑐𝑞𝑗 −
(2𝑞𝑗 − 𝑞𝑗′)
2
6(3𝜃1 − 2𝜃0)
] 
(𝑗, 𝑗′ = 1,2, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑗′), 𝛼1 + 𝛼2 = 𝑐(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) −
(𝑞1 + 𝑞2)
2
6(3𝜃1 − 2𝜃0)
. 
 
Thus, the optimal solution exists continuously29. 
Then, consider a case in which each P contracts with different As to evaluate the solution under 
common agency compared with the solution with exclusive agents. Since I do not introduce 
competitive relationships, the solution does not differ from that in the case with one P and one A. As 
explained above, investment is 
𝑖∗(𝜃) =
𝑞𝑗
2𝜃 − 𝜃0
 𝑗 = 1,2.  
The common agent is assigned a lower incentive for investments (𝑞/(2𝜃 − 𝜃0) > 𝑞/(3𝜃 −
2𝜃0) for 𝜃 > 𝜃0), rendering the system’s performance less efficient. Martimort (1996) demonstrates 
the relative inefficiency of common agency for the case of complementary demands. In this study, 
complementarity exists in the cost structure, rather than in demand, and thus, the property of the 
solution differs. In Martimort’s model, when demand is complementary, coordination between the 
principals is critical, which is advantageous to common agency. However, when costs are 
complementary as in the present model, the contractors do not coordinate with each other but play a 
blame game to force their rivals into paying an investment cost. The difference in the minimization 
problems between exclusive agency and common agency is in the effective inequality constraints. In 
the case of exclusive agency, the effective constraint is a participation constraint which secures a non-
negative profit for the subcontractor, while in the case of common agency, it is the incentive constraint 
which requires no less profits for an additional contract. A prime contractor of a common agent 
designs the payment such that it compensates only the incremental cost of the offered job. Thus, both 
prime contractors offer less payments and provide fewer incentives for the subcontractor to 
investment, resulting in less efficient outcomes for the overall subcontracting system. 
Note that complementarity in the cost structure is assumed to be an extreme case. If A engages 
in cost-reducing investments, the investment affects production for both Ps. Thus, in this model, it is 
not surprising that the case in which exclusive As invest is less efficient than the case with a common 
agent because of the duplicated investments. However, inefficiency intrinsic to common agency may 
sometimes be so severe that it overwhelms the inefficiency of duplicated investments. That is, there 
are cases in which the total efficiency of a system with exclusive agency is higher than that of a system 
with common agency despite duplicated investments. Region (𝜃1, 𝑞2/𝑞1) in Figure 1 , depicted using 
oblique lines, indicates that the total cost is higher with a common agent than that with two exclusive 
agents when 𝑐 = 1 and 𝜃0 = 1. Thus, when there is considerable heterogeneity among contracts for 
the agent, the inefficiency with a common agent may exceed the inefficiency from duplicated 
investments. 
 
29 According to Martimort (1992), it is not possible to obtain a solution by simultaneously applying revelation 
principles to both the principals. Here, a solution is obtained by fixing one of the first-order conditions for its 
rival, as in Martimort (1996). 
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Figure 1. Region where inefficiency with a common agent exceeds that of duplicated investments 
Another difficulty with common agency can be demonstrated in the optimal solution. The 
optimal solutions continuously exist and the information of the offer made by rival P is required to 
determine a solution. The remainder of this section explains the problem using a simpler and more 
intuitive example. I assume 𝑞1 = 𝑞2 = 1  and no cost-reducing investments. Further, the cost to 
produce one product is 10 and that to produce two products is 15 under a complementary cost 
structure. The conditions for offers by both Ps to be accepted are 
𝑤1 + 𝑤2 − 15 ≥ 𝑤1 − 10 , 𝑤1 + 𝑤2 − 15 ≥ 𝑤2 − 10, 𝑤1 + 𝑤2 − 15 ≥ 0,  
where 𝑤𝑖 , (𝑖 = 1,2) is the offer by 𝑃𝑖. Cost minimizing of both Ps provides the following solution: 
𝑤1 + 𝑤2 = 15,  𝑤1 ≥ 5,  𝑤2 ≥ 5.  
The solutions continuously exist depending on the distribution of gains obtained through 
savings from joint production. If one solution is attained by some negotiation among the Ps, the 
solution becomes a Nash equilibrium on the condition of a rival offer. 
Then, consider a case in which the costs are substitutes of each other. Assume the cost to produce 
one product is 10 and that to produce two products is 25. The conditions for offers by both Ps to be 
accepted are 
𝑤1 + 𝑤2 − 25 ≥ 𝑤1 − 10 , 𝑤1 + 𝑤2 − 25 ≥ 𝑤2 − 10, 𝑤1 + 𝑤2 − 15 ≥ 0,  
and cost-minimizing of both Ps provides the following solution: 
𝑤1 = 𝑤2 = 15.   
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Thus, when the costs are substitutes of each other, the common agent can acquire profits if not 
information rent 30 . This result is in contrast to that for the abovementioned case of cost 
complementarity, where the rents acquired by A are exhausted in the cost-minimizing offer by both 
Ps.  
The distribution of benefits from transactions exhibits the same nature in the solutions of both 
the model with cost-reducing investments and the simple model with cost complementarity. The rent 
acquired by A is also exhausted in the cost-minimizing offer by the Ps if A is a common agent. Then, 
the rent for the common agent reduces compared with that for the exclusive agent. In fact, if the 
profits acquired by an exclusive agent and a common agent have the same attributes 𝜃 and order of 
products 𝑞, denoted as 𝜋𝐸(𝜃) and 𝜋𝐶(𝜃), then 
𝜋𝐸(𝜃) =
𝑞2(𝜃1 − 𝜃)
2(2𝜃1 − 𝜃0)(2𝜃 − 𝜃0)
>
𝑞2(𝜃1 − 𝜃)
2(3𝜃1 − 2𝜃0)(3𝜃 − 2𝜃0)
= 𝜋𝐶(𝜃).  
In this section, the inefficiency incurred under common agency is considerable enough to 
overwhelm the inefficiency of duplicated investments. Moreover, the complementarities in the cost 
structure may render surplus distribution more difficult in the content industry. In this industry, the 
surplus of agents in contracts with multiple principals is likely to be squeezed. In other words, when 
the same technology acquired to trade with a given contractor is effective when used with other 
contractors, the producers’ cost-minimizing activity extracts a larger part of the gains. During the late 
20th century, keiretsu was a common approach to subcontracting in the assembly industry, and 
particularly the automobile and electric apparatus industries. Thus, subcontractors typically had one 
parent contractor and could avoid common agency problems. The healthy growth of subcontractors 
contributes to that of their parent assemblers. By contrast, when programme broadcasters delegate 
production to several producers, the advanced technologies of subcontracting producers may be used 
in productions for rival broadcasters. This information can considerably reduce producers’ profits. 
Taguchi (2011) examines Japan’s die industry and offers key implications for the present model. 
The author reports that typical die manufacturers trade with 4–5 contractors. In the past three decades 
of the 20th century, die manufacturers have earned sufficient profits to invest in their plants. Since 
the know-how required to produce dies includes numerous complicated factors, even small-scale 
manufacturers have been able to secure stable orders with sufficient cash flow, allowing them to 
make active investments to keep pace with new technologies. However, even with technology levels 
remaining high, now the trade is barely profitable due to competition from emerging countries that 
have also caught up with the new technologies. Meanwhile, numerically controlled machine tools, 
data accumulation, and systematization have replaced skilled labour. This transition is considered a 
change from increasing marginal cost (employment of skilled labour) to decreasing marginal cost, or 
a complementary cost structure (versatile technology from digitalization). This change in the 
common agency system reduces rents for die manufacturers and deprives them of funds for 
replacement investments. 
4. Conclusions 
This study attempts to theoretically explain a content industry with a hierarchical subcontracting 
system. More specifically, it analyses the multitask agency problem and the common agency problem 
as key sources of difficulties. Both theories explain the inefficiencies caused in the overall 
subcontracting system and particularly, the asymmetric distribution of benefits. The characteristics 
of the content industry further contribute to the severity of these problems in the subcontracting 
systems. 
 
30 Martimort (1996) shows that common agency is selected even when exclusive agents are desired. Note that 
this, however, possibly leads to inefficiency when costs are substitutes. 
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First, the content industry’s products have ambiguous quality attributes that are difficult to 
verify or define in contracts. This results in discrepancies between the evaluations of contractors and 
the efforts of subcontractors, which further results in inefficient resource allocation (i.e. multitask 
agency problem). The asymmetric distribution of benefits between contractors and subcontractors 
discusses in Section 1 may result from a ‘hold up’: prime contractors use the evaluation of 
unverifiable quality as a pretext to exploit subcontractors. 
Second, subcontractors in Japan’s content industry traditionally work with multiple contractors. 
The model analysis in this study shows that when the costs for contractors are complementary, 
inefficiency caused by adverse selection is intensified in common agency because contractors play a 
blame game to force their rivals into incurring the subcontractors’ investment cost. In addition, the 
inefficiency of common agency may overwhelm that of duplicated investments when there is 
considerable heterogeneity in the contracts for an agent. As a result, the surplus for the common 
agents lose a considerable portion of their surplus to prime contractors. 
These factors have yet to be fully addressed in the literature, which largely focuses on problems 
caused by imperfect competition between contractors and subcontractors and on differences in firm 
sizes between contractors and subcontractors. Contrary to previous works highlighting the unfair 
distribution of benefits, this study finds that the significant inefficiency problem in the content 
industry can be attributed to the subcontracting system. In the long run, the weakened 
competitiveness of Japan’s content industry is likely to worsen. Moreover, industrial policies may 
further contribute to this issue as seen in the case of strategies to promote the diversification of trade 
partners. To revitalize the industry, it is necessary to recognize the essential features of the problem. 
First, contracts in the content industry should recognize the importance of product quality. Second, 
when an offer by a prime contractor requires investments by a subcontractor, the expenses should be 
shared even if the technology is versatile. A noteworthy conclusion of this study is that the 
hierarchical subcontracting system is not suitable for the content industry. 
4.1. Research Limitations  
This study aims to explain possible inefficiencies using two models of agency theories. The 
models are not comprehensive to describe the industry. Each are prepared to point out one feature 
of the industry. It is yet to be proved that inefficiencies observed in content industries in Japan have 
such characteristics predicted in models here. Note that most industry reports introduced in the first 
section stresses inequality problems in distribution of surplus. The relation between the inequality 
and the inefficiency in the industry is tried to be analysed here, but not fully.  
4.2. Theoretical Implications 
When the total surplus in a supply chain is limited and to be curtailed by increased competition, 
the distribution fairness is important for keeping the system active. Therefore, the issue analysed here 
is not limited to the industry in Japan, where the problem is exhibited in an intensified way. The 
literature on analyses on media industries might have paid little attention to transaction cost or 
agency problem. If collaboration of various agents or fusion of industries becomes crucial in media 
industries, these concepts may help to understand problems in the performance of the industry. 
4.3. Suggestions for future researches 
Further research is needed especially in detailed case studies on the industry. The inefficiency 
should be identified by empirical studies comparing the productivity in Japan with that in other 
countries. To estimate the level of technical inefficiency relative to a frontier productivity is another 
method to identify the inefficiency. There are other industries under subcontracting system in Japan. 
Performance of those industries has not been evaluated although the same problems were pointed 
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out, for example, in construction industries. The possible inefficiency in those industries should be 
investigated and compared with inefficiency analysed here.   
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